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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
\T 
V • 
ANTHONY JOSEPH DURAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20090943 
INTRODUCTION 
ANTHONY JOSEPH DURAN, by and through his attorney of record responds to 
the argument made by the State in its opening brief. 
ARGUMENT 
L NEITHER THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE NOR THE PALMER 
DECISION OBVIATE THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE COURT OBTAIN AN 
EXPRESS WAIVER FROM THE DEFENDANT BEFORE WAIVING A JURY 
TRIAL 
The state contends in its response that the defendant would be prohibited from 
requiring the jury to try the habitually violent offender enhancement ("HVO") because he 
invited that error. Aplee's Br. at 13-24. Primarily, the state contends that defense counsel 
"repeatedly affirmed" that the court, rather than the jury, should try the enhancement. Id 
at 13. This claim is erroneous for two reasons. 
First, the invited error doctrine cannot apply because the trial court affirmatively 
ruled on the issue prior to any possible assent by defense counsel. 
Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error. By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this 
principle by 'discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so 
as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.... Thus, encouraging 
counsel to actively participate in all proceedings and to raise any possible error at 
the time of its occurrence fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court 
should have the first opportunity to address a claim of error. 
Pratt v.Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 17, 164 P.3d 366 (quoting State v. Winfield 2006 UT 4, f 
15, 128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In order for the invited 
error doctrine to apply, defense counsel had to have invited that error—he cannot invite it 
if he is not the one making the error. If the court makes a ruling, defense counsel's failure 
to object to the ruling does not constitute invited error. Defense counsel must "lead the 
trial court into making the error." State v. Carreno, 2005 UT App 208, If 11, 113 P.3d 
1004. See also. State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, ^ 14, 20 P.3d 265 ("Defense counsel's 
statements made in this case after the trial court had denied defendant's motion to 
suppress do not constitute invited error.") In this case, the first mention of the matter was 
made by the court, when it stated: "Now, let me, before we look at jury instructions, it's 
my understanding that if the jury convicts, the question about the habitual criminal and 
all the enhancements, that is not an issue for the jury to decide." (R. 364:127.) At this 
2 
point, defense counsel stated, "No, it is not." Id. The court then reasserted that it was a 
matter for judicial decision-making and defense counsel agreed, stating, "That's my 
understanding." IcL at 127-28. 
Yet, this open court discussion was not a full reflection of what happened prior to 
these statements. The Court stated its recollection of what happened: 
My recollection of what happened here is that before the trial started we met in 
chambers. I met with both counsel in chambers, to discuss the question of how to 
go about handling the habitual criminal. And we were all in agreement that we 
were going to bifurcate the trial. The jury would not know anything at all about his 
prior record. And then when we were in chambers I mentioned something about 
this State versus Palmer case, the one that had been decided about the Court of 
Appeals, and the holding. I said, it seems to me that what they are saying is that 
the jury is not necessarily required to hear evidence when we're talking about 
enhancing penalties. And I asked both attorneys what your position was on this. 
And both said, Vm not sure. I haven't had a chance to read the case. And certainly 
I'm not being critical of anyone. I wanted to give you a chance to look at it, 
because my impression was — is that it was taking it away from the jury and that it 
was just an enhancement and there was no reason for a jury to decide that, and 
that's how I perceived the ruling in State versus Palmer at least from the Court of 
Appeals. 
I suggested that both sides take a look at the case, and let me know how 
you wanted to proceed. My impression is, that after we finished the trial, after we 
got the verdict from the jury, neither side raised any objection or requested that I 
keep the jury. In fact, my recollection is I asked is there any reason to keep the 
jury, is there any reason that we need to keep this particular jury after we've had a 
verdict? And I — I don't remember anyone, either side saying yes we need to keep 
the jury now to decide the habitual criminal. 
And so, because no one really said anything, I thought it was okay to go 
ahead and release the jury. And I just assumed, I guess, that both sides were in 
agreement with my interpretation of that Palmer case. And now I'm a little 
surprised when the defense asks for a mistrial claiming that the jury should have 
been retained. Because nobody said anything at the conclusion of that trial, when 
the verdict was announced. And frankly if you had said something I may have 
handled it differently. 
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(R. 362:16-18) (emphasis added). 
It is clear from this discussion that the court made an assumption, based on the 
parties' silence, that they intended to waive the jury. Yet, the prosecutor openly 
questioned this action after the jury's release, and it was the court, again, who clearly 
stated that it was its decision and not one for the jury. (R. 366:116.)1 
What is clear from this discussion is that the court stated its position in chambers: 
based on State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206,189 P.3d 69, it ruled that the HVO 
enhancement was its decision and not the jury's. Both counsel stated that they weren't 
sure what the law was on that issue. Yet, both sides were clearly uncomfortable. The 
prosecutor questioned the Court at length about whether it was the appropriate action. (R. 
366:115-17.) Defense counsel stated that he relied exclusively on the Court's 
representation: "The Court had mentioned it and I may have said something like, well, if 
that's what the state of the law is, I guess that's it." (R. 362:7.) Both counsel expressly 
indicated a lack of understanding about the law on this issue. Yet, it was the trial court 
who consistently and unequivocally stated its interpretation of the law. 
A defendant cannot invite the error if it was the court itself who made the error— 
especially when defense counsel indicates to the court that he lacks understanding on the 
1
 THE COURT: Okay. Well, like I said, if I'm wrong or you're not in agreement with that. 
I don't know what we do to correct it now, because we've let the jury go. I mean, that's 
how I read the law is that it was now — the habitual criminal is now a question for the 
Judge rather than -
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issue and that he will be relying on the court's understanding of the law. At no point did 
the defendant lead the court into committing this error. In fact, quite the opposite 
occurred: the court led both parties into committing this error. 
The invited error doctrine was designed to prevent parties from sabotaging cases 
by assenting to issues at the trial court and then raising them in the appellate court. 
Nothing of the sort happened here. When defense counsel became aware of the issue, he 
brought the matter up to the trial court in time for the court to correct the error. The 
prosecutor seemed to agree with defense counsel's reasoning. He argued to the court that 
a different jury could be brought in to decide the HVO enhancement. (R. 366:20.) The 
court disagreed, stating that defendant at that point, had waived his right to a jury. (R. 
366:21.) There is no question that both parties contemplated the remedy of bringing in a 
different jury. Defense counsel never intentionally misled the court about the state of the 
law—in fact, when he became aware of the issue, he properly raised the matter with the 
trial court in time for it to remedy the error. 
Second, even assuming defense counsel invited the error, the Constitution 
nonetheless requires the Court, even with the affirmative statements of defense counsel, 
to obtain a waiver from the defendant personally. Defendant argued in his opening brief 
that courts must obtain express waivers from defendants if they are waiving critical 
constitutional rights. Aplnt's Br. 22-24. Defense counsel cannot invite the error of 
waiving a jury trial—the court must obtain an express waiver from the defendant himself. 
Bovkin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) ("Presuming waiver from a silent 
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record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and 
evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and 
understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver9'); Aetna Ins. Co. v. 
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393-94 (1937) ("But, as the right of jury trial is fundamental, 
courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.") Defense counsel in a 
criminal case cannot waive a jury on behalf of his client because it is a "personal" or 
fundamental right. See, ££., United States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 63 (2d. Cir. 1999)2; 
United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding reversible error for 
a failure to obtain defendant's express waiver to his presence at a jury trial. "[I]t is clear 
that rather than permitting defense counsel to waive Gordon's right to presence, the court 
should have held an on-the-record hearing to advise Gordon of his right to be present at 
voir dire and obtained a personal waiver in open court."); State v. Gore, 955 A.2d 1, 8-9 
(Conn. 2008) ("One of the rights that a criminal defendant personally must waive is the 
fundamental right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, supra, 128 S. Ct. 
2
 "Criminal defendants possess two types of constitutional rights, and a different waiver 
standard applies to each. See Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing 
United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1992) (in banc)), cert, denied, 
118 S. Ct. 1077 (1998). The first category involves rights that defense counsel may waive 
on behalf of defendant because they concern strategic and tactical matters such as 
selective introduction of evidence, stipulations, objections, and pre-trial motions. See id. 
The second category involves rights that only defendant himself may waive because they 
are 'personal' and include matters like pleading guilty, waiving a jury trial, pursuing an 
appeal, and deciding to testify. See id. at 77-78. When defendants personally waive their 
rights, the waivers 'not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done 
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,748,25 L. Ed. 2d 747,90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970)." 
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1771; Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,417-18, 418 n.24, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 
798, rehearing denied, 485 U.S. 983, 108 S. Ct 1283, 99 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1988); 11 United 
States v. Plitman, supra, 194 F.3d 63; United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 842, 113 S. Ct. 127, 121 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1992); State v. Gibbs, 
254 Conn. 578, 610-11, 611 n.27, 758 A.2d 327 (2000). ... [D]efense counsel alone 
cannot waive a jury trial on behalf of the defendant"); Balbosa v. State, 571 S.E.2d 368, 
369 (Ga .2002) ("[Defense counsel's] waiver cannot suffice because, when counsel 
waives a jury trial in the presence of the defendant, the most that can be said is that the 
defendant voluntarily waived a jury. It remains to be seen whether that waiver was 
knowing and intelligent. To ensure that Balbosa waived his right to a jury trial 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, the trial court should have conducted a colloquy 
with Balbosa himself") (internal citations omitted). 
In one Kansas case, one juror on a twelve-person jury became ill. State v. Morfitt 
956 P.2d 719, 723 (Kan. App. 1998). Defense counsel stated that he had conferred with 
his client and that they would waive the juror's presence. Id The court did not question 
the defendant. Citing a similar case, the court held that "The defendant has a right to trial 
by jury. This is assured to him .... by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.... Since 
the right belongs to the defendant, we conclude that the defendant personally, and not 
counsel for the defendant, has the right to assent to a trial by less than a twelve-person 
jury." Id. at 724 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Addressing the issue of 
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waiver, the court stated, "a defendant must be personally advised by the trial court of his 
or her right to a 12-person jury and must, thereafter, personally and voluntarily waive that 
right in writing or in open court on the record and consent to a reduced number of jurors. 
The waiver must be made by the defendant, not the defendant's attorney, and a waiver 
will not be presumed from a silent record." Id. (internal citations omitted). In Morfitt, the 
State argued that defense counsel invited the error by assenting to the 11-person jury. The 
Court disagreed: 
The State's contention that this can be considered invited error does not stand up 
under these previous appellate decisions. We also agree ... that these are 
fundamental rights that preclude an analysis of harmless error. Consequently, we 
have no alternative but to reverse and remand this case for a new trial. 
IdL 
In a case very similar to the one at hand, the Court of Appeals of Michigan found 
an error for the trial court's failure to obtain an express waiver from the defendant as to 
an habitual offender enhancement. People v. Leggions, 386 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. App. 
1986). 
Defendant initially requested a jury trial, but, after the prosecution presented its 
proofs of defendant's three prior felony convictions, defense counsel announced, 
out of the presence of the jury, that, after discussing it with defendant, defendant 
desired to bypass the jury and let the court decide. Defendant may waive his right 
to trial by jury, but the waiver must be in writing, signed by the defendant, filed 
and made a part of the record of the case.... The right to a jury trial cannot be 
waived by defense counsel. Since defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial 
on the habitual offender charge in writing, reversal is required. Despite 
prosecution argument to the contrary, the fact that defendant originally requested a 
jury trial and apparently changed his mind midtrial does not alter the requirement 
that waiver must be made in writing in open court. 
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Defendant's habitual offender conviction is reversed. 
Id. at 617-18. Although the Leggions case had to do with a statute which required 
defendants to waive by writing, the requirement nonetheless remains a concrete, bedrock 
foundation of law, that defendants, and not their counsel, must affirmatively waive jury 
trials on any issue. 
The issue of whether defense counsel invited the error is irrelevant because 
defense counsel does not have the authority or ability to waive the defendant's right to a 
jury trial. The defendant alone, possesses this right and the court failed to inquire of him 
to determine whether he knowingly and intentionally was waiving this right. 
The state also contends that the Palmer decision is dispositive of the issue at hand 
because he only raised a technical legal challenge to the convictions and not a factual 
challenge. Aplee's Br. at 24-27. Defendant already noted several reasons why the Palmer 
decision is distinguishable from the case at hand. Aplnt's Br. at 24-28. Yet, the state 
argues that because defendant's challenge was merely legal, Palmer prevents him from 
raising it to a jury. Aplee's Br. at 24-27. The state seems to be basing this off of the issues 
raised by defense counsel to the court, which it claims only had to do with the case 
numbers on the alleged priors. Aplee's Br. at 26. Yet, defense counsel raised three 
arguments: 1) the case numbers of the convictions were not listed on the habitual 
offender enhancement, as required by the statute; 2) the HVO enhancement needed to be 
heard immediately by the jury; 3) that a failure to give notice only prohibits the defendant 
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from raising certain affirmative defenses, but that a jury could still decide the HVO 
enhancement. (R. 366:7-8.) 
The first problem with the state's reasoning is that defendant questioned the fact of 
whether he was a habitually violent offender—he wanted it tried to a jury. A jury would 
be required to find more than the existence of prior convictions. They would have to 
determine, within the statute, whether the prior convictions were valid and whether 
defendant was a habitually violent offender as defined in the statute. See Utah Code Ann. 
76-3-203.5. The state bases its argument off of statements made by defense counsel at a 
bench trial. Yet, the reality is that if the HVO enhancement were being heard by the jury, 
defense counsel would have certainly presented the evidence in a different way and 
would have made different arguments. 
In addition, defendant did allege a factual dispute about the prior convictions. The 
factual dispute at issue was whether the prior convictions were valid, which is certainly 
an issue if the case numbers are not properly noticed, and whether defendant was a 
habitually violent offender. Presenting these matters to a court, as opposed to a jury, 
would be more basic, brief and annotated. If a jury, rather, were present, counsel would 
have presented the enhancement in more of a factual light. 
In short, not only does the statute in this case expressly require a jury to hear the 
HVO enhancement, the defendant never expressly waived that right. Palmer does not 
support a reading that a defendant may have his HVO enhancement tried to the court 
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without his own waiver of that right. Palmer merely states that the DUI statute at issue 
did not require a jury to decide the existence of prior convictions. One cannot stretch 
Palmer's interpretation of the DUI statute to the HVO statute, which expressly requires a 
jury finding. Additionally, at no point in Palmer does the court state that defendants need 
not expressly waive their right to a jury trial (and in this case, one that the legislature has 
expressly granted defendants)—a position unaddressed by the state in its response. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Duran asks this court find that the trial court 
erred in failing to try the habitual violent offender enhancement to the jury. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ' ^ day of September, 2010. 
SAMUELP. NEWTON 
AttWey for the Defendant/Appellant 
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